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Abstract
Information security and privacy regulation are significant areas of legislation in the
financial and micro-finance sectors in the world. There are significant disparities between the
developed and developing countries concerning adoption and application of the data protection
laws. The developed world has exemplified its laws in the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) clause of the European Union that comes into effect on May 18, 2018. In the US, the
main law has been the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of the late 1990s. The developing
countries, on the other hand, exhibit slow drafting of new finance and micro-finance privacy
laws and still use policies of the 1990s. The purpose of the study is, therefore, to examine the
effectiveness of privacy and data protection laws in finance and micro-finance sectors in the
developed and developing parts of the world in the current technological era. The method of the
study is a mixed qualitative and quantitative assessment of case studies of recent literature on the
subject. Each case study will feature the variables of the presence of privacy laws and
information security regulations, and the level of enforcement of those regulations that inform
the statistics. The other variable will be the level of effectiveness of the application of privacy
and information security laws in developed and developing nations based on case study
outcomes. The results indicate that out of 10 examined cases, six show failures of the laws in
developing nations while 1 shows failure in a developed nation (South Korea) and 1, in the US,
presents mixed results. The recommendations include the adoption of international laws that
govern data security in the financial sector, such as the current GDPR of the European of Union.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Introduction
The rise in data breaches all over the world makes the prioritization of privacy and
information security key amongst various successful enterprises. The interconnected global
economy has made it possible to share data across different jurisdictions and create new digital
identities (Blum, 2017). For this reason, there is a need for data security laws to fill the
vulnerabilities that this interconnected system presents. One of these is the need to propagate
new access restriction systems that can reduce breaches of identity theft (Blum, 2017). However,
with the stipulated technological flow of information and data, various other aspects of
information security and privacy are under crossfire. For instance, the development of consumer
relationship technology, intense competition and the need for personalized products has made
banking institutions to tap into consumer data (Omarini, 2011). With various developed
economies, the above issue will often be considered as a violation of the consumer privacy
rights, while in developing countries, the limited regulatory framework does not consider such
issues to be impacting or else, critical when facilitating the protection of their citizens. Making a
comparison between the data and privacy regulations implemented by most developed states like
EU and U.S, Cano (2014) insists that developing countries can limit the occurrence of fraudulent
activities in their economies by adopting some of the security measures implemented by
regulators like SEC. Laying implicit emphasis on the various supervision and regulatory policies
integrated by Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), the research critiques the expected outcomes that
the various privacy and data protection policies would have upon developing nations/economies.

10
The policies used by developed nations, in essence, bring about the improvement of
quality services in the financial sector. This is because information security regulation at the
private level has involved over 30 years of continuous research in many sectors, including
finance, to assess software weaknesses against threats (Schmidt & White, 2017). This has made
data protection strong in the United States. However, Schmidt and White (2017), note that
despite this proactive approach, major cyber incidents still occur, with a case in point being the
Equifax breach of 2017. Analysts touted that the compromise occurred from the use of security
programs that were not up-to-date unlike those of the hackers (Schmidt & White, 2017). The
outcome brings into question the ability of enterprises to maintain in-house technological
maintenance (Schmidt & White, 2017). Data security as such deals with the existing enterprise's
ability to determine the manner in which data in a computer system could be subject to sharing
with other third parties.
According to Agelidis (2016), under the GLBA law of 1999, information security for
financial companies entails the practices that entities enforce to safeguard personal data against
external access. It is also an expectation for the companies to offer written evidence to their
clients on how they intend to ensure the latter's privacy (Agelidis, 2016). The loss of information
and data often occur as a result of unauthorized access, examination, use, modification,
disclosure, copying, or moving data/information without customer consent. For instance, the
digital disclosure of hacked information publicly has become common due to the mass access to
the Internet as a platform for corporate information (Agelidis, 2016).
To enable effective protection levels, the U.S Securities and other industrial policing
facilitate the realization of proper regulatory standards, which will essentially mandate the
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creation of information security practices at an organizational or national level. The SEC, for
example, provides a risk assessment document each year that companies fill to review the threat
background in the context of financial losses and customer data breaches (Khan, 2016). Drawing
from the above issue, one might conclusively concur that realizing the protection of consumer
details, information, and data (mainly, concerning financial statements) requires nations,
enterprises, and global corporations (such as WTO, World Bank) to develop security or privacy
networks/technologies.
Technology in developing countries, on the other hand, has attracted many small
organizations in finance and micro-finance, among other industries (Dahiru & Allison, 2014).
Evidence shows that most of the African small-scale enterprises and micro-finance are not as
adept as their Western counterparts in the countering of information security and privacy
challenges (Dahiru & Allison, 2014). Many first-time ventures into the digital environment often
incur cybercrime-related losses (Dahiru & Allison, 2014).
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2016), argues that although
African states have evolved regional data protection mechanisms, these are still enshrined in
trading pacts. As a result, the eventual outcome of such regional models is uncertain in the
current epoch where many countries lack technological resources to keep up with advanced
cybercrime (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2016). In Asian countries,
there is a growing need to adopt data protection frameworks that go beyond the 1990s, when
most of these countries promulgated most of their privacy laws (Yu, 2017). Indeed, most of the
implemented regulations have to integrate protections that align with technology and innovative
paradigms.
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The various industries in developing countries often experience the emerging or else,
impacting aspects that correlate to data security and regulations. In this sense, most of the
developing world’s industries could be said to be inconsiderate of the fact that some industries
and business’ operational efficiency, essentially calls for significant transformations in sectors
such as banking tech. Additionally, the use of Information Technology in various sectors
including telecommunication has fawned certain requirement for data protection in banks and
other industries (Singh, Picot, Kranz, Gupta, & Ojha, 2013). In such an occurrence or shifts in
regulations to compel improvement of operational, enterprise, banking and micro-finance’
regulatory standards, as well as, the mitigation of data breaches that are quite prevalent under
most financial foundations in developing nations, company or governmental agencies, and other
interested lobby groups such as WTO (world trade organization) should always involve usage of
policing framework and data protection strategies.
Corporate information security interventions and the reporting of data breaches are some
of the recommended ways to reduce financial losses and privacy compromises (Laube & Bohme,
2016). Various nations require that companies regularly report all ensuing cyber-attacks (Laube
& Bohme, 2016). One corporate intervention is the use of trained employees to run the
information security department of a company or to outsource it (Patel, 2008). Either way,
studies from outsourcing in India have revealed that both internal and external data protection
rules are difficult to follow as they are continually changing (Patel, 2008). One report indicates
that one in every five Western companies with either the internal or external data protection
model does not comply with data breach reporting requirements due to the ever-changing
statuses of the laws (Patel, 2008). A company’s regulations, in essence, can facilitate the
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increment in efficiency specifically during the identification of unauthorized and external file
access. However, unlike most companies operating in developed nations, the possibility of data
breaches as well as privacy violations in various developing or further, undeveloped states will
always be high corresponding to the challenging conditions experienced at the economic
markets/levels.
There is also a low commitment to keep up with new technology in developing countries
especially in micro-finance, such as in Asia (Yu, 2017). Despite having a growth rate of ten times
in Internet access since the early 2000s, China and other countries of Asia are now coping with
outdated laws of previous decades (Broadhurst & Chang, 2013; Yu, 2017). The inability by
microfinance institutions to implement usage of better protection mechanisms especially at
financial and organizational levels will inevitably bring about the increase in vulnerability to data
breaches as well as loss of revenue.
With the rise of mobile and Information and Communications Technology (ICT)
framework in developing nations, businesses are not just exposed to traditional market
competition but electronic data security (Klimburg & Zylberberg, 2015). This security necessity
sometimes comes with a price tag in that it costs banking institutions vital customer data
(Klimburg & Zylberberg, 2015). For instance, cyber-attacks, generally at the financial level, have
fleeced South Africa five hundred and seventy-three million dollars (Klimburg & Zylberberg,
2015). This is mostly due to lack of a proper data regulatory law. As such, enterprises will only
assure data and privacy regulations, if the protection mechanisms used on employees’ records,
loyalty schemes, customer details/preferences, and finally, data transactions are characteristic of
the effective regulatory framework.
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Various developing countries like India and South Africa have undertaken policy
measures to regulate breaches on financial data against such acts as identity theft and phishing
(Cassim, 2015). This is due to the realization that financial companies in both Western and
developing nations cannot do without technology which they use to store sensitive data on
computer systems (Klimberg & Zilberberg, 2015). In the United Kingdom and the United States,
there has been a drive to limit the susceptibility of firms to hacking acts through strong
regulation (Cassim, 2015). In the US, the first major such act was the 1978 'Right to Financial
Privacy Act' (Cassim, 2015). In the UK, the 'Fraud Prevention Service' (Cassim, 2015) is the law
that covers online and financial crimes. In developing nations, like South Africa, there have been
few anti-identity theft laws which have led to the mushrooming misuse of credit card data
(Cassim, 2015).
The occurrence of phishing, hacking, and therefore, the loss of company, database, and
institutional private data could at times be attributable to elements regarding the professionalism
of the ‘information security manager.' In developing nations such as South Africa, black hat theft
and the resultant financial fleecing of the victims has led to the ranking of the country as the
seventh of the fifty most affected nations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Brodie, 2014).
The vulnerability exists due to the recent accessibility of the web via mobile devices by most
South Africans, and for companies using personal computers, the lack of proper security
installations gives easy entry to the hackers (Brodie, 2014). For this reason, countries in need of
superior economic progress need to install information security systems that match the changing
face of technology that hackers easily command (Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff, 2009). It is clear that
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information protection is no longer a vestige for ICT but the entire economic performance of a
corporate institution, especially in finance (Dlamini et al., 2009).
Problem Statement
The lack of regulations to safeguard data privacy in developing countries is a serious
issue compared to developed countries. These concerns further intensify when considering
Microfinance as a sector which is most popular in developing countries where privacy
regulations are at a minimum. Therefore, there is a higher possibility of privacy violations in
these communities with the increasing involvement of new technologies where large amounts of
consumer data are being used. Making an articulation to the privacy concerns that have been
rising in the global stage, it will be necessary for companies’ especially international
corporations such as Apple, to guarantee privacy and confidentiality of customer/consumer
data/information. As such, with this research study, the researcher will facilitate the identification
of critical privacy regulations in many developing nations as well as some developed countries
that ought to be subject to address these issues to ensure the limited loss of data/information.
Research Objectives
1. This research project seeks to highlight through case studies the level of enforcement
of information security and privacy laws in both developed and developing countries.
The main focus in the developed world will be the implementation of GLBA law of
1999 in the US as well as the impact of the General Data Protection Regulation in the
European Union. At least 6 case studies from Africa and Asia will provide details of
the level of effective use of the draft data protection laws for the regions' microfinance and finance institutions.
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2. The study will also quantify the level of awareness of privacy and data protection
laws in developing countries. Details from such countries as Nigeria, Uganda, and
Ghana will provide data on how the customers of micro-finance institutions of the
respective nations approach inputting data online.
3. With outdated technology being the major bottleneck of implementation of data
protection and privacy laws, it is also the objective of the research to review how
financial institutions have kept up with technological changes. Critical areas of
examination will be the adoption of a new set of regulations to reflect the switch from
privacy laws that were written before the Internet age. The regions under review
include Africa and South-east Asia.
4. While comparing the data protection and security policies across developed and
developing countries, the study will also examine significant data breaches of recent
times. Some of these will include the Morgan Stanley customer data compromise of
2012 to 2014, the South Korea telecommunication hacking, and breaches in Africa.
Purpose of the Study
Advocating for improvement in data security, confidentiality, and privacy is a necessity
for any company and governments around the globe. Most data losses in various developing
nations usually result in enormous financial losses that in essence impact the economy. With this
research study, the comparison between the security and data regulations implemented by
developed and developing nations generates the required and significant issues that ought to be
addressed to enable the eventual attainment of better global consumer/customer protection
mechanisms.
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The purpose of the study is to compare data protection and privacy regulation laws of
developed countries with those of other countries. The study will examine the European Union's
GDPR and the US GLBA, as some of the two key legislation for data regulation, globally. Three
foci of the study will be (1) To review the privacy and data protection measures that finance and
micro-finance institutions have put up to adhere to privacy regulations of their respective
countries or regions. (2) Based on the financial loss magnitude per country's financial sector, it
is the purpose of this study to illustrate that most of the losses that occur in such areas as microfinance or mobile banking take place through lax implementation, misuse or non-existence of
such laws (Abdulrauf, 2016). For instance, the study will touch upon Nigeria's $550 million
losses as a result of lax enforcement of data protection laws in its mobile banking sector (BaurYazbck et al., 2017). (3) The study also seeks to reveal that keeping up with technological
changes in the banking sector in developing countries such as Malaysia is a salvaging point for
the better protection of privacy in the digital age. It is apparent that many of the developing
nations still use their 1990s laws (Shuhidan, Hamidi, & Saleh, 2017).
Finally, it is the purpose of the study, through sample comparisons between developed
and developing nations, to reveal that data breaches can still happen internally when an insider
leads to the exposure of corporate data to potential hackers (Security Exchange Commission,
2016). Case studies of such breaches will serve as an illustration of the need to come up with
new policies in both developed and developing countries to handle information security.
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Research Questions
The study will have three research questions, namely:
1. How effective are the information security measures and privacy regulations of
developed versus developing countries in the financial sector?
2. As evidenced by the case study results, how effectively have finance institutions
enforced the privacy and data protection laws in their jurisdictions?
3. Since part of the reasons financial institutions adopt privacy and data regulation
policies is to reduce financial losses, how effective are these based on case study
results of financial breaches?
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Information security laws differ in diverse demographic and economic regions of the
globe. For instance, in much of the developed world, data security laws are an integral mandate
for all firms while other nations enforce them for only as much as they shield financial
institutions from the legal outcomes of compromises (Miskam & Shahwahid, 2014). Irrespective
of the jurisdiction, electronic transfer of banking data and holding the same on servers has
become a necessity (Hamidovic, 2014). For the above reasons, it follows that many countries
have fawned laws that categorize the identity of such information and the consequences of
sensitive data transfer (Hamidovic, 2014). This is out of the belief that information is liable to
lose much of its privacy and be prone to diverse kinds of breaching when it assumes an
electronic format (Sarabi, Naghizadeh, Liu, & Liu, 2016).
Around 18 individuals suffer from a cyber-spying incident every second, which adds up
to the one and a half million worldwide incidents per day (Cohen, 2014). The developing
countries suffer most of the brunt because of the lapse of time before the setup of information
system laws. For instance, rising economies like China, the Indian subcontinent and some parts
of south-east Asia ratified their information security laws as late as early this decade (Cohen,
2014). In the financial sector, the developing world is also the most affected because of
bewilderment on which areas to regulate. A case in point is the slow formulation of data laws in
certain countries on electronic pay cards (Johnson, Lincke, Imhof, & Lim, 2014). Still, nations
like Brazil were as late as 2014 deliberating on regulating cyber laws around these payment
systems (Johnson et al., 2014). Another South American nation, Argentina, by 2013 still had not

20
put in place particular clauses to govern Internet privacy through ensuring protection on cookie
information and sensitive consumer data (Craig et al., 2013).
Even in the first world nations, there are still high likelihoods of data manipulation,
especially during the introduction of new networks. For instance, Australia has a privacy law, but
it is not as strict as the EU counterpart in that a financial institution does not have to inform the
authorities of every act of mining consumer data as long as the latter is notified (Craig et al.,
2013). The proposal to offer uncharged public scale Internet also poses a threat to information
security, despite the existing strong laws, due to multi-network routing (European Union Agency
for Network and Information Security, 2014). One such system that is set to roll out in Europe in
the mid-2020s sets out to offer zero-charged Internet to the public of the member states (Pham,
Galic, & Taylor, 2017). The inherent threat is that public cyberspace is easier to breach when it is
free for everyone to access than one secured intranet (Pham et al., 2017). In light of the above
details, this literature review will focus on holistic international privacy laws and how they apply
to two key related sectors. These include financial institutions and micro-financial institutions.
The scope will be the developed and developing world. Each section will offer the latest literary
input on the subject.
Financial Industry and Micro-finance
The first area in which to explore the financial industry as it is cognizant of privacy laws
in the United States. The financial sector is a key driver of the country's economy (Mohammed,
2015). This is the reason the GLB Act of 1999 specifies that US banks ought to notify customers
on how they intend to handle their private data (Walrath, 2017). The Act governs how banks
disseminate private data to external agents that the customer does not directly relate to,
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especially about security cards and account details (Mohammed, 2015). Its strengths include full
disclosure by banks to clients (Walrath, 2017). Despite being more advanced than similar acts in
developing nations, there are limitations of this law's applicability in a changing financial context
(Walrath, 2017).
In Europe's financial sector, some of the strictest rules on information security are already
in force (Baker, 2016). Not only do banking institutions get into the spotlight in their own
countries but in the European Union economic bloc (Baker, 2016). For instance, the very core of
their businesses, namely the acquisition of customers is under scrutiny from the various angles of
privacy, fraud, and ethics (Baker, 2016). Even when customers are likely to be the perpetrators of
the crimes, some laws, like the United Kingdom's PRA, delve into the accountability of a bank in
its behavior to its clientele. This is in recognition of the opinion that a profit-making entity may
manipulate consumer data unscrupulously for gain (Baker, 2016).
The financial industry in developing nations faces serious information breaches due to
still immature policies. In South Africa, for instance, data compromises are inside jobs that
involve banks' Information Technology staff (Ngcamu, 2016). A case study by Ngcamu (2016),
highlighted that the dearth of non-disclosure contracts led to staff misuse of information outside
the company. The financial institution in question also was a pacesetter in not apportioning
information risk as a part of its risk management mandate (Ngcamu, 2016).
Another developing world context is that of Indonesia. The financial institutions of the
south-east Asian nation still concentrate on the past laws that govern cyber data and privacy
(Palupy, 2011). Most companies still utilize the outdated clauses despite the quick disruptions in
software that have visited upon the banking sector in recent years (Palupy, 2011). Across the
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borders, Singaporean and Indonesian banking sectors are having to bow to governmental
pressure to sufficiently protect their consumers. In Singapore, the laws are evolving from mainly
governmental controls to flexible regulations that allow private financial institutions to join the
latest protection initiatives (Palupy, 2011).
About the micro-finance sector, developing nations' micro institutions struggle to survive
due to both financial and poor regulatory matters (Fotabong, 2012). For instance in Cameroon,
since early this decade the failure rate of major companies in 2010 not necessarily affiliated to
data breaching has led to increased government involvement to avert future closures (Fotabong,
2012). A primary method of affordable technology that micro-financial institutions in Cameroon
use are mobile, which due to its widespread use generates a high level of data vulnerability
(Mwafise & Stapleton, 2012). One of the major reasons for the adoption is the development of a
telecom-based money remittance system (Mwafise & Stapleton, 2012). The same study found
that of all the factors that led to the widespread utility of the service, privacy (at 96.8%) and
restrictions to user data (92.5%) came at numbers four and five after such factors as simplicity
(100%), confidentiality (100%) and trust (Mwafise & Stapleton, 2012). This highlighted that
privacy is still in the developing stage even in the users' contexts in the country.
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Figure 1: Factors influencing the adoption of mobile money transfer in Cameroon.
In developed societies, such as Europe, the major information security factor that governs
the few operating micro-institutions' data security is a WiFi network (European Union Agency
for Network and Information Security, 2014). The networks that most banks use includes WiFi
which if unsecured with passwords poses privacy risks for the users. The fact that many financial
bodies have operations across country boundaries means multi-jurisdictional access to customer
data and hence multiplied vulnerability. To overcome these variances, the European jurisdictions
have sought to unify the information security bills to overcome conflict of interest, across
borders (European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, 2014). Due to the
advancement of cyber laws in the EU setting, what remains is to secure the loopholes in the
networks, which means the routing paths that information flows from small institutes to large
banks after customers send in their requests (European Union Agency for Network and
Information Security, 2014). The figure below illustrates the exposed network paths.
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Therefore, even as financial and micro-finance institutions execute various measures to
ensure data privacy, there are still missing gaps in both developed and developing nations.

Figure 2: Sample financial institutions network path.
The world, for instance, the connectivity of data along multiple bank communication
paths increases the manifold severity of a breach should it happen (Camillo, 2016; European
Union Agency for Network and Information Security, 2014). Studies in recent times reveal that
banks that take a trio of steps, inclusive of in-house, external and network harmonization can
stem the tide of network breaches (Camillo, 2016). This is especially true of companies that
operate in a highly interconnected system that demands different legal implementation of
conflicting information security protocols.
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International Privacy Regulations
The modern privacy laws have a foundation in Scandinavia. In 1973, Sweden published
its initial privacy clause, which set the way for other countries to prepare similar allencompassing laws (Booysen & Neo, 2017). By the first quarter of 2016, a hundred and ten
similar bills had become institutionalized in as many nations. This was more than two additional
nations per year that ratified their laws similarly (Booysen & Neo, 2017). Banking institutions
were the first to embrace this form of information security through their in-house tax and cash
revenue matters (Mello, 2012). They would soon find complications when they crossed borders
as each sovereign state had a law a little different from the home country, ideally meaning that
unscrupulous secrecy would not work (Mello, 2012). This is despite the fact that privacy laws
serve the same objective (Booysen & Neo, 2017).
Privacy laws in all sectors began in earnest in the 1800s when governments would use
records to surveil over their citizens (Solove, 2006). The request for privacy details during each
population count led to grumbling about privacy. The institutionalization of law in the second
half of the 1800s to cease invasion of public data in the United States' census was one outcome
of this trend (Solove, 2006).
The first evidence of laws governing technological breach of privacy was in the liberal
age of the 1960s (Kenyon, 2016). One such act was the use of extensions to record another
party's telephone messages, which led to privacy clauses against telephonic tapping (Solove,
2006). The 1990s saw the rise of the Internet with equal fear of financial breaches during the
dot.com era, and the US GLB Act was a culmination of decade-long online confidentiality acts
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(Walrath, 2017). The primary law of the current century is the EU privacy or GDPR which will
apply fully in 2018 among European member states (Allen & Overy LLP, 2017).
Table 1
Comparative Timelines of the Medium and Use of General Privacy Laws from the 1800s to
2010s
Timeline of Privacy laws

Medium

Use

1800-1899

Paper records, post & telegraph. State surveillance (Solove,
2006).

1900-1960

Public systems, telephone, state To prevent legal privacy torts
records.

and to enhance federal
espionage (Solove, 2006).

1960-1990

The constitution, information

The rise of the '60s

acts of the 1960s, espionage

technological liberalism led to

privacy laws of the 1970s,

numerous constitutional acts

computer laws of the late 1980s while the coming of the
and audio-visual privacy laws

computer led to the ratification

of the late 1980s (Solove, 2006) of new laws (Kenyon, 2016;
Solove, 2006).
The 90s

The Internet

GLB Act (1999) in the US and
numerous web-based privacy
bills (Walrath, 2017).

2000-2018

Internet, cloud

Numerous privacy acts on
security after 9/11 (Lane, 2014).
The EU's new Internet privacy
laws are coming into effect
mid-May 2018 (Allen & Overy
LLP, 2017).
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One of the remarkable problems of the current international privacy regulations is the
lack of harmonization across countries (Allen & Overy LLP, 2017; Bu-Pasha, 2017). This is
important especially in the background of the fact that much data is seamless and universal to
apply due to the development of a similar Internet worldwide (Bu-Pasha, 2017). The latest
offering to bridge this gap is the harmonized EU law that takes effect in mid-May, 2018 (Allen &
Overy LLP, 2017). From that date, all continental privacy framework will supersede the select
country equivalents (Allen & Overy LLP, 2017).
Despite emanating from the biggest financial and trading duo in the world, US privacy
legacy is markedly disparate from its European counterpart (Movius & Krup, 2009). The US
emphasizes local financial institutions, but it does not have as stringent regulation as the EU
(Movius & Krup, 2009). Therefore, whenever there are tradeoffs of information during a crossAtlantic deal, any consequences of privacy become challenging to resolve unless there is court
intervention (VanWasshnova, 2008). For instance, the discovery of the 2006 clandestine
passenger espionage program by the US in Europe led to the condemnation of privacy data
breaching by the court (VanWasshnova, 2008). This is despite the two continents putting enough
protection measures against financial breaches in their respective institutions (Movius & Krup,
2009).
Just like the rest of the world has different information security and privacy bills, so are
developing countries. In Africa, principally Lesotho, the laws are still in the development stage
despite being encompassed in a regional bloc (Makulilo & Mophethe, 2016). The country passed
its latest act in 2011, but this would likely undergo revisiting after regional bodies like the
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trading community of South African states evolved policies and required member countries to
update theirs (Makulilo & Mophethe, 2016).
Naude (2014), states that South Africa has had a poor record in the enactment of privacy
clauses to keep its digital citizenry safe. However, a 2013 bill sought to transform the country's
track record with the entrenchment of international elements (Naude, 2014). These included the
perpetual updating of the laws to stay up-to-date with the ever-upgrading technology that leaves
behind old laws (Naude, 2014). A case study in 2008 of the biggest users of computers,
comprising of corporate leaders, technology personnel and other employees in South Africa
found that restriction to computer access by outsiders was only enforced at 57% levels (Stander,
Dunnet, & Rizzo, 2008). However, the biggest means of protection were Internet security
programs at a level of 98% (Stander et al., 2008). Fifty-three percent of participants also
indicated that their security personnel enforced data protection checks (Stander et al., 2008).
Despite this outcome, the study concluded that the legal protection mechanisms do not read the
same page with the technological changes responsible for the breaches (Stander et al., 2008).
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Figure 3: Type of in-house data protection in South Africa in 2008.
In short, though there is a rising global need to shield the privacy of users in, especially
sensitive fields like finance, the international regulations have been pragmatic (Sorensen, 2017).
Each state except for regional bodies, like the EU, have fawned different jurisdictional
frameworks (Bu-Pasha, 2017). Harmonization will be the one recommendation for filling the gap
of these different laws that regulate similar devices, software and data breaches worldwide (BuPasha, 2017; Sorensen, 2017).
Privacy Regulations and Policies in the Finance Sector
The rise of soft money remittances is one of the major factors for privacy regulations in
the finance sector. For instance, in 2016, five hundred billion soft cash exchanges took place
around the world, which acted as a catalyst to the need to safeguard the senders' and recipients'
data (Carbo-Valverde, 2016).
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For the above reason, a country-by-country review on privacy rules on banking can
provide new insights into the importance governments have placed on online banking. For
instance, Singapore's 2014 promulgation on the individual's right to information security
provided that a business that spammed a client with unwanted e-commerce missives would elicit
a monetary fine (Raul, 2014). In the same year, Russia imposed mandatory upkeep of all data,
financial or otherwise, within the country's servers (Raul, 2014). China would follow suit with a
cybersecurity law that came up in 2017 that stipulates the localization of secret information
(Brink, Wang, Veldhoen, & Arnbak, 2017). The epitome of all privacy laws remains that of
Europe's 'Data Protection Regulation' (Raul, 2014), which many other nations have either tried to
imitate or shunned, altogether.
The major privacy regulation law in the US is GLBA. It regulates the disbursement or
storage of consumer data by banks (Sheng & Cranor, 2012). It also governs the use of factual
data, puts a limit on workers' information access by outsiders and expects banks to install
information security processes to keep data safe (Sheng & Cranor, 2012).
A 1999 to 2005 longitudinal survey on the pressure finance sector players in the United
States face from the enactment of GLBA law revealed mixed outcomes (Sheng & Cranor, 2012).
Though many banks were of the view that information regulation was paramount to safeguard
consumer information, there was counter-argument for the need to relax the rules (Sheng &
Cranor, 2012). The study concluded that even in the US the regulations did not have much effect
as small finance entities still shared customers' data with affiliated companies (Sheng & Cranor,
2012). On average, the largest ten finance institutions and retail outlets in the survey shared
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consumer data one hundred percent with affiliates, 40 to 80% with non-affiliates and gave
consumers opting-out options of between 40 and 100% magnitudes.
120
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US banks
US retailers
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0
Data sharing:
affiliates

Data sharing: non- Degree given for
affiliates
Opting-out

Figure 4: How banks and retailers transfer data with affiliates and non-affiliates in the US.
Another important legal recourse for consumers about travesties on their privacy by
outsiders or banks is the 'Electronic Fund Transfer Act' (Mohammed, 2015). It came about as a
result of the increase in non-cash remittances (Carbo-Verde, 2016). The law is under
implementation in diverse states in different forms including in governing mobile and electronic
card transactions (Budnitz, 2016; Mohammed, 2015). It covers all kinds of gadgets, some of
which are hinted upon such as smartphones when they feature in financial issues involving user
information (Budnitz, 2016). The privacy policy of EFTA is to the effect that the custodians of
the points of sale and automated teller machines notify the authorities in situations where
consumer data undergoes unscrupulous access (Mohammed, 2015). This is important because
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automated payment devices are not manned and thus may not have a person directly responsible
for stolen information (Mohammed, 2015).
Privacy policy and regulations in developing countries are significantly behind those of
the developed ones. For instance, South Africa has the ECT Act of the early 2000s that still
governs how e-banking takes care of web consumers (Kabanda, 2010; Mtuze, 2015). It is
interesting that before 2002 when the law came up, the country's e-bankers had no clear
guidelines on how financial communique online held the sender legally liable to the message
(Kabanda, 2010). The gist of this new clause is that Internet portals of institutions engaged in ecommerce ought to have overt and covert manifestations on how they maintain the
confidentiality of their clients' information (Mtuze, 2015). The overt part is the presence of
privacy policy widgets at the nether part of banks' online databases to reveal their exact stand on
client data protection (Kabanda, 2010). A survey by Kabanda (2010), in the late 2000s, found
that South Africans had very low trust in their banking data repositories as they felt that the
institutions only enforced select ECT stipulations.
In Nigeria, the privacy laws exist, but they are blunt to the essence that institutions only
enforce them by having a privacy officer in place (Patricia & Izuchukwu, 2014). The first fullyfledged legal recourse that captured the modern rise of technology in finance was 2006's ebanking rules or 'E-Electronic Banking' (Ezeoha, 2006). They laid out grounds for broad areas of
Internet-based breaches of information security not covered before (Ezeoha, 2006). Despite the
law, the country's banking institutions still carry out the 'know your clients' (Abdulrauf, 2016)
policy as a formality, sometimes without regard to the regulations. This is a precondition that for
the banks to provide optimal services, they ought to mine some necessary data of their customer
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base without breaching their privacy. Often, they take extra information which amounts to a
contravention of the stipulations on client protection (Abdulrauf, 2016).
Asia's developing economies such as that of India are also behind their Western peers,
mainly European, on privacy policies around finance (Jamil & Khan, 2011). India ranks as one
of the biggest outsourcing nations globally and hence the high need for banking institutions to
safeguard users who transact trade online (Directo, 2014). The existing act is 'IT Act 2000' (Jamil
& Khan, 2011). It underwent new amendments in recent years following the promulgation of
PDPB, a bill that came up to the national assembly in 2006 to offer EU-like privacy on all
aspects of online life, not just banking (Jamil & Khan, 2011). In a 2011 survey, 26% of CFOs in
corporations around the world specified India as the best country for offshore task delivery
(Directo, 2014). The same survey also unveiled that Western entities could easily alter this
preference and seek outsourcing elsewhere were India's privacy laws not to change from their
developing phase (Directo, 2014).
Some of the very different recent privacy laws are from emerging economies, principally
China. The country in 2017 promulgated its collective set of regulations on 'cybersecurity' (Brink
et al., 2017). What is disparate from its Western counterparts is that the regulation is highly
information security-oriented in that it targets data compromises that come from outside its
national borders (Brink et al., 2017). For this reason, the law stipulates that individuals and banks
keep their sensitive data in country-based servers rather than abroad (KPMG, 2017). Another
stipulation is that although financial institutions and individuals may have the right to keep their
information confidential, the state has the power to request for data that it deems sensitive (Brik
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et al., 2017). Table 2 summarizes the new stipulations for financial and other entities operating
within China in 2018.
Table 2
China's New Cybersecurity Law of 2017 Summary
Regulation
Internal data protection

Effect
Use of better data protection methods through
the installation of information security systems
for China-based companies. (Brink et al., 2017).

Personnel

Recruitment of information security personnel
or network operators, per business, to enforce
network protection (Brink et al., 2017; KPMG,
2017).

Privacy

Storage, transmission and consensual use of
customer data per the new law (Brink et al.,
2017)

Privacy across borders

Institutions to keep in mind the probability of
information being leaked, lost or spied upon by
foreigners and thus the need for in-country
storage (Brink et al., 2017; KPMG, 2017)

The above section has highlighted that the sector still needs to promulgate more laws to
keep up with the changing face of online banking, especially in upcoming markets in Africa and
Asia. Zahoor, Ud-din, and Sunami (2016), reiterate this point in their report that the finance
sector attracts more hackers than all other industries. The latest minefields of consumer data that
criminals go on to use; include electronic payment devices, automated teller machines, and even
direct leakage of a customer's banking identity (Zahoor et al., 2016).
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As the case of China's new privacy regulations show, it is a legal expectation to maintain
consumer data internally through the employment of data security officers (Brink et al., 2017).
For this to happen in developing nations, which are currently ill-equipped to meet the challenge,
there needs a training program by the banks on data protection (Tse et al., 2013). Through their
survey on global banking institutions that implemented such education, Tse et al. (2013) found
that in 2012, no more than 47% of the participants had put in place training initiatives to handle
data enlightenment for their staff members. Of these, 37% set their information security and
privacy policies to guide their third-party relations on data protection (Tse et al., 2013).
Therefore, it is apparent that global financial institutions need vibrant training of their staff as a
starting point to realize their privacy aims.
Privacy in the Micro-finance Sector
The regulation of micro-finance institutions takes many forms and mostly affects the
developing regions of the world. Despite this essence, data privacy is still informal in many
countries (Egboro, 2015). In Nigeria, for instance, while there are ethical approaches by major
banks to client data, these rules do not apply to micro-finance (Egboro, 2015). Indeed, these
institutions discuss consumer data in boardrooms, which puts the data at risk of leakage (Egboro,
2015).
The nearest equivalent in the EU is e-banking and mobile transactions, which the Emoney ordinance already covers (Pouchous, 2012). The law guides for a limited period of the
retention of customer details after which it undergoes annihilation (Lumsden, 2013; Pouchous,
2012). In the United States, the closest form of micro-finance is also mobile finance. It is
essential in privacy regulations emanated from the fact that by 2013, cellular gadgets had
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replaced existing telephones per home by a margin of 31.6% (Lumsden, 2013). Whereas in the
EU companies have a finite time of keeping consumer data after which it is deleted, in the US
firms can hold confidential details of cellular subscribers indefinitely (Lumsden, 2013). For this
reason, legal agitators in the country have been calling for a stricter law than the current one
about the exact period to keep such sensitive data until it is destroyed (Lumsden, 2013).
To govern information security in e-banking, the US currently enforces the 'Cyberspace
Policy' (Lumsden, 2013). In privacy and mobile telemarketing, the US Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) rule provides many stipulations on the use of limits to consumer data. For
instance, marketing directly ought to have an opt-in or out option imposed on network
companies, but this does not apply to non-affiliates (King, 2008). Though, it is criminal for the
latter to use the data to pretext consumers (King, 2008). The use of consumer information is an
on 'as is' basis, which implies that the mobile banker can store and transfer the customer's details
but only up to the limit where there is personal consent (King, 2008). There is no regulation for
non-affiliates and manufacturers of gadgets though it is criminal to pretext (King, 2008). The
chart below outlines the above stipulations.
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Figure 5: Regulatory areas in mobile banking in the US.
In most parts of the developing world, bills to protect clients' information privacy have
been snail-paced in comparison to their European e-banking counterparts (Pouchous, 2012).
Only states in south-east Asia such as Indonesia have been on the forefront in recent years to
promote privacy and other protection policies due to the rapid digitization of the micro-finance
niche (Pouchous, 2012). In Kenya, the development of mobile payments has also colluded with
over-dependence on the mobile device as a banking tool (Pouchous, 2012). However, the very
simplicity of mobile utility puts the often technologically uninformed Kenyan customer at risk
(Pouchous, 2012).
Sub-saharan Africa is one of the critical regions as far as micro banking is concerned to
cater for the low earnings bracket in need of banking (Arun & Murinde, 2010). The introduction
of privacy regulation has been embraced since the late 2000s due to the emergence of electronic
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and phone-based transactions that may undermine data confidentiality (Arun & Murinde, 2010).
One of the factors that are under regulation is the social capital of the client. For instance, in
Mauritius, there is a clause that gives microfinance institutions the ability to process the user's
data to find the latter's eligibility to access the banking service. The clause also guides on the
limits of such an investigation (Arun & Murinde 2010). Most other nations in the continent apart
from South Africa had no such law in 2010 (Arun & Murinde, 2010). Nigeria, on the other hand,
lacks laws to specifically regulate the microfinance outlets despite their being present in many
cities (Oluyombo, 2007). The country's 1952 law on banking bypassed mention of the term
'microfinance' and so do latter-day clauses in the late 2000s (Oluyombo, 2007).
Uganda, on its part, despite the proliferation of new forms of micro banking has been a
slow implementer of privacy laws. By 2016, there was still a lack of an information security
clause to govern privacy (Privacy International, 2016). The country's information docket
proposed such a bill in 2014, but to date, the passage of a drafted copy is yet to come to light
(Privacy International, 2016). The country's governing privacy laws are mostly international in
nature and surround issues on human rights rather than data (Privacy International, 2016).
Ugandans are most likely to disclose their private details to banking sites only when there are
over details that enhance trust, including the presence of a privacy statement on the website's
page (Mwesigwa, 2010). There has been low progress in embracing e-banking because of doubts
about privacy regulations and the perceptions of low information security online by the majority
of the unbanked customers (Mwesigwa, 2010). Due to the lack of such laws, the reliance on
perceptions on risks has become the main indicator of whether to use an online banking service
or not in Uganda (Mwesigwa, 2010). The diagram below illustrates such perceptions.
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Figure 6: Risks due to lack of privacy laws in micro-finance in Uganda.
In South American nations, micro-finance is under regulation albeit in mainly financial
points of view such as deposit disclosure information (Ardic, Ibrahim, & Mylenko, 2011). Chile,
however, passed the 1999 law known as 'Protection of Privacy' (Ardic et al., 2011). A recent
proposed update to the bill was to the effect that banks, micro or large, still using outdated laws
and needed to translate them to the technological age (Carey & Silva, 2016). Table 3
comparatively summarizes the latest points that the new law stipulates.
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Table 3
Privacy Data Laws on Micro and Mainstream Banking in Chile
1999 Privacy Law

2016-17 proposed update bill

The law specified written acceptance to banks' This may change from 'written' to technological
use of consumer data.
transmission of data in the digital banking age
(Carey & Silva, 2016).
The current privacy regulation has no clear
The new law may configure if consent exempts
definitions of what is exempted from client
such currently undefined purposes as the inconsent to give details to banks.
house use of customer data, among others
(Carey & Silva, 2016).
Unconditional consenting exists in the current Unconditional consenting will receive an update
law.
to include client acceptance of the use of their
data by institutions, via diverse mediums like
the internet (Carey & Silva, 2016).
In Asia, privacy laws have been around since the 1990s, but they are still developing in
many countries (Greenleaf, 2014). In Taiwan, there have been many instances of fines imposed
on small and large banking venues for breaching consumers' sensitive data (Greenleaf, 2014). A
case in point was when two banks faced fines that amounted to a hundred and thirty thousand
dollars separately. Their reason was for the exposure of their clients' banking details to criminals
who hacked into their systems (Greenleaf, 2014). Thus, there are ties between information
security and privacy in Taiwanese laws. Around Asia, the term privacy has multiple meanings,
but each country interprets it through its court system, which determines what constitutes data
compromises, especially when there are doubts (Greenleaf, 2014; Kershaw, 2014). This is
because there are usually few precedents to use due to the rapid progress of technology that
requires regular updates of privacy rules (Kershaw, 2014).
In the Philippines, all rules are governed by the 'Data Privacy Act 2011' (Government of
Philippines, 2014). The adoption of the law was the first of its kind as it embraced the many
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entities with online databases including state and private (Government of Philippines, 2014). The
clause concerns universal information confidentiality, but it applies to the microfinance sector in
the way the institutions mine and disburse clients' data (Sahu, 2018). The clause stipulates that
the micro-banking institution can only gather and transfer personal details under the
authorization of the customer who is the official custodian of such information (Sahu, 2018).
The law defines the confidential data as familial, spiritual, ethical or stance-related. It also
categorizes personal health status as a part of banking details that can only be transferred through
the individual's consent (Sahu, 2018).
Information security and privacy have become inseparable in recent times due to the
increment of breaches even in the microfinance setting. Gyabi and Shrivas (2016), presents a
case of how community banks in a West African context find ties between privacy and
information security. In a Ghanaian rural background, the government enforces information
technology policies to streamline confidentiality and to ensure the low vulnerability of
microfinance clients' data (Gyabi & Shrivas, 2016). Thus, it is a requirement that communitylevel small banks to carry out frequent system auditing to assess the likelihood of system attacks.
The above case study assessed that the small financial outlets found system threats
insurmountable and even in situations where a hacking act happened, they might not necessarily
be well equipped to alert the customer of the outcome (Gyabi & Shrivas, 2016). The survey on a
broad number of customers in the above setting returned the results as follows: 37% of the
respondents replied that the strongest privacy and data protection policy their small banks
enforced was the password. 17% identified the DataPro software as in use by their microfinance
institutions to mitigate information leakage. Only 12% replied that there was a strong use of an
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access restriction rule, while 9% specified that their small banks had computer usage policies
(Gyabi & Srhivas, 2016). The chart below highlights the above results from the survey.
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Figure 7: Survey results in Ghana in 2016 on information security and privacy measures in rural
microfinance.
Therefore, micro-finance, despite being a catalyst for development in the unbanked
communities of the Third World, poses a threat to consumer data due to the slow implementation
of data protection regulations. Most rules in South America, apart from Chile, are broad
sweeping and do not have reconnaissance on the changing phase of online privacy in
microfinance (Ardic et al., 2011). In Asia, despite efforts by some states to implement the laws to
keep up with the alterations in cyber technology, some countries still use their 1990s' policies
(Greenleaf, 2014). African states are still underdeveloped in microfinance laws, and in certain
countries like Uganda, the rules are yet to exist even though the institutions bank the majority of
the rural customers (Mwesigwa, 2010).
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The Conclusion to Literature Review
From the above sections, it is apparent that information security and privacy is one of the
most important measures that banks and microfinance institutions currently implement
(Hamidovic, 2014). The study has enunciated the prevalence of strict laws in the European
Union that safeguard the keeping, retrieval and the deletion of a customer's sensitive information.
The economic bloc also currently has one of the strongest set of privacy rules in the world that
member countries will superimpose over their sovereign legislations by mid-May 2018 (Allen &
Overy LLP, 2017).
In the United States, data protection is mainly a mandate of the GBL Act of 1999 which
came up at the height of the dot.com era (Sheng & Cranor, 2012). The law still applies even
today despite lax conformity by some finance outlets due to the rise of new forms of technology
(Sheng & Cranor, 2012). One of these is e-banking, which is the closest form to microfinance in
the developed world.
The literature has revealed that the bulk of privacy non-implementation is due to either
bank laxity or lack of the rules in the developing world. Nigeria's micro-finance establishments,
for example, treat consumer details in an open manner not only during transactions but in board
discussions (Egboro, 2015). In Uganda, a 2014 proposed privacy bill be yet to come into law two
years later (Privacy International, 2016). Though efforts are apparent in south-east Asia, where
countries are instituting bills to replace old 1990s' laws in the background of new technology, the
sector is yet to unfold in comparison to the West (Greenleaf, 2014).
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Chapter 3: Methodology (Mixed Method Approach)
Introduction
The study will entail a mixed methodology with both quantitative and qualitative
elements. The research will review case studies from Internet sites, databases, and peer-reviewed
journals. Each section will compare the enforcement of information security or privacy laws in
sample cases in developed and developing countries. The first variable will be the presence of
privacy laws in the country under the case study. The second variable will be the degree of
enforcement of information security in the country under the survey. The dependent variable
will be the degree of effectiveness of privacy laws according to the adoption by microfinance or
finance sectors of the given jurisdiction. The effectiveness measure can include low information
security breaches.
Case Studies on Financial Sector Privacy
Case study in a developed country. In the US in 2015, Morgan Stanley faced an
allegation for breaching the data of hundreds of thousands of customers through an internal
worker (Federal Trade Commission, 2015). The case's complexity emanated from the fact that
the banking institution had implemented all privacy rules per the United States GBLA and other
FTC guidelines. It was also notable that the access of sensitive data was limited to staff members
up to the extent that they needed it for corporate purposes (Federal Trade Commission, 2015).
The complication came up because the worker exposed over seven hundred and thirty thousand
accounts to professional hackers (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2016).
A case in point was that the individual was able to access the report repository and
transfer the data to an intranet database at a personal residence (Federal Trade Commission,
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2015). The data would later find its way into dongles and other individual gadgets, a
contravention of the bank's privacy policies (Federal Trade Commission, 2015). From there it
dispersed online through a third-party act of hacking where the affected individuals' details were
under auction (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2016). The federal body intervened to
rule whether to follow the banker's counterargument of one of its workers inadvertently hacking
criminally into its system or whether the banker was responsible for the exposure of a client's
privacy through weak data storage.
Tesco bank breach–UK. In November 2016, Tesco Bank was subjected to a hack that
saw £2.5 million stolen off from 9,000 of its accounts in what some security experts are
describing as the most serious, attack ever to hit the United Kingdom's banking sector. As
described by Frost (2017) in her article, the attack is believed to have encountered through its
online banking system, affecting 20,000 accounts in total. The attack had targeted a weekend,
where banks are generally slow to react to online threats while the stolen money was then used to
buy thousands of goods from worldwide retailers using the contactless mobile-phone payment
method.
As put forward by Jones (2016) in the article on the guardian website, the author claims
that as found by an academic team the criminals have used merchants’ payment websites to guess
people’s card details. More elaboratively the criminals use software that automatically generates
different variations of a card’s security data–for example, the card number, expiry date and threedigit security code known as the CVV–and fires these off to hundreds or even thousands of
websites around the world at the same time. The reply to the transaction would confirm whether
or not the guess was right.

46
The bank had adhered to the Regulation 61 of the Payment Services Regulations 2009 in
the UK and paid refunded its affected customers £2.5 million. The regulation above requires a
bank to refund the amount of an unauthorized payment transaction to the payer and to restore the
debited payment account to the state it would have been in had the unauthorized payment
transaction not taken place. Furthermore, UK's Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) could have
considered the breach of Principle 3 of its Principles for Businesses. Under this principle, a firm
must take reasonable care to organize and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with
adequate risk management systems. This will raise questions as to whether adequate protection
against the risk posed by evolving forms of cybercrime was in place at Tesco Bank. If a failure in
this area is established there is the possibility that the bank will face a substantial financial
penalty, although this has been yet to be decided.
Australia: AAPT hacking case study. In a case study published by Palfrey (2013)
discusses the attack, and the implication under previous and new laws, which targeted the
Australian Internet Service Provider AAPT resulting in customer data was being hacked and
published on the internet.
The data exposed by the anonymous hackers was held on a server managed by
WebCentral Pty, Ltd, a web-hosting business unit of Melbourne IT. Under the contract between
AAPT and WebCentral, WebCentral was required to adequately manage and maintain the server,
except for the custom application content and data, which was the responsibility of AAPT. The
hackers accessed the data through this customer application named “Cold Fusion” while AAPT
was using an old version of Cold Fusion, which was known to have vulnerabilities. When
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Melbourne IT became aware of the attack it notified AAPT, which immediately disconnected
from the network and took steps to ensure the data could not be further compromised.
As put forward by Palfrey (2013) Australian Privacy Commissioner, Timothy Pilgrim,
found AAPT had breached the Privacy Act in respect of the incident. More elaboratively Under
Australian National Privacy Policy (NPP 4.1), an organization is required to take reasonable
steps to protect the personal information it held from misuse and loss and unauthorized access or
disclosure. The question in this scenario was whether AAPT or WebCentral held the data. The
Commissioner took the view that AAPT held the data despite it being stored on WebCentral's
server. Accordingly, AAPT had the obligation under NPP4.1. The finding of this case study will
be discussed further in Chapter 4.
Case study in a developing country. Adelola, Dawson, and Batmaz (2015), surveyed in
Nigeria to discover the locals' views on information security and privacy. The study concentrated
on all aspects of privacy, but from the outset, the authors warranted that the majority gave
privacy a financial connotation. The dependent variables included the instruments the individuals
used that put their data at risk including e-banking, e-commerce and traditional banks' websites
(Adelola et al., 2015).
The survey consisted of 51% male and 49% female respondents, a total of 72. They were
of banking ages of between 20 and 50 years, with the majority (41%) being 20 to 29 years of
age. The highest education qualification of the participants was the Bachelor's level at 42% while
the lowest was a certificate, at 1 percent (Adelola et al., 2015).
The main questions of the survey (see Appendix B) included the following abridged ones:
1. Do you ever get concerned about the data you offer online?
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2. Have spam messages from non-affiliates to your bank ever keep you on the alert on
your data?
3. Are you knowledgeable of identity theft and its consequences?
4. Is the state reliable as a custodian of privacy of individual information?
All the questions concerned mostly financial institutions that most of the surveyed group
dealt with online and the authors considered them equally important to the respondents (Adelola
et al., 2015). The chart below indicates the main classifications of privacy that the above four
questions highlighted:
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Figure 8: Main areas of privacy concerns among Nigerians, Adeola et al. (2015) survey.
Case Studies on Microfinance
Survey from Asia. Shuhidan et al. (2017) carried out a study in Malaysia on mobile
banking security. The sample microfinance customers who used mobile banking received
electronic questions on many aspects including privacy. The questions on privacy read, in
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abridged form: 1] How do you feel about your private information being used by mobile banks?
2] Are you of the view that your mobile banking data is at risk of hacking?
The study groups consisted of demographically exposed users of micro-finance
technology such as m-banking, in the age bracket of 20-39 (Shuhidan et al., 2017). They
numbered 384. Two hundred and six of these were male while a 178 were female. Among the
dependencies of the survey was the educational attainment of which 72.7% had a degree and
27.3 a postgraduate degree. None had a personal business but the majority, at 82.3%, worked in
private capacities. All used smart devices for communication and financial needs (Shuhidan et al.
(2017).
Among the preliminary concerns which the study identified that contributed to the main
issue of privacy was the fact that they feared the loss of their data via faulty transactions that
would hurt their social relations (Shuhidan et al., 2017). It is interesting that the survey also
asked the respondents of other factors outside privacy that affected them. The performance was
the main question, and it attracted a response rate higher than that of privacy (Shuhidan et al.,
2017). (For results see discussion section). Appendix C presents the questions of the survey.
Survey from Africa. To underscore the ease of breach of privacy in microfinance sectors
in developing countries, the following details present a survey of the number of microfinance
and informal banking customers in several African countries. A study by Maimbo, Faye, and
Triki (2011), found that there is no easy categorization of microfinance from informal savings
outlets. Thus, there is a high likelihood of some uncategorized institutions to escape privacy
laws (Maimbo et al., 2011).
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For instance, the survey found that in countries like Kenya, 33% of the respondents did
not have any financial affiliation, while 26% were in microfinance (Maimbo et al., 2011). In
Malawi, on the other hand, the majority of the surveyed were informal financial institutions, at
55%, while 19% of the participants were in microfinance. In Namibia, 2% were in microfinance
while 52% were unbanked. Uganda had 42% of microfinance respondents while 33% had no
financial affiliation. The respondents from Zambia were 14% from microfinance while 65% were
unbanked (Maimbo et al., 2011).
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Figure 9: Microfinance vs. informal banking as per survey respondents by Maimbo et al. (2011).
A case study in rural Ghana by Gyabi and Shrivas (2016), sought to partake of rural
financial institutions due to their small-scale operations against their information security and
privacy measures. A sample area of Ashanti in interior Ghana served as the background for the
study. The scope of the research was thirty thousand total customers. However, the research
focused on particular service providers and mixed the workers', managers' and customers' input
in the questionnaire-based survey (Gyabi & Shrivas, 2016).
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The main questions of the survey in abridged format included the following:
1. Which data privacy policy does your company have?
2. Which was the last date when your bank updated the data breach action guideline?
3. Does your financial outlet undertake mock information recovery tests to prepare for
breaches? Appendix D has the full questionnaire format, while the findings are in the
next section.
Case Study on the Variable of Information Security in Microfinance
According to a report by Baur-Yazbeck, Jenik, and Valenzuela (2017), the lax regulatory
framework on micro-finance and particularly mobile banking has affected negatively on East
African and West African countries. The study highlighted the effect of the following
information security variables: (1) the impact of data identity theft via mobile banking, (2), the
level of 'social engineering' (Baur-Yazbeck et al., 2017) during transactions, and (3) virus are
planting on clients' mobile devices.
The study then used the data to estimate the total effect, in monetary terms, of the lax
information security regulations. The preliminary estimate for the entire of Africa's mobile
banking was two billion dollars’ worth of lost finance (Baur-Yazbck et al., 2017). That of Ghana
was fifty million dollars (Baur-Yazbeck et al., 2017). The full results of the report are in the
findings section and Appendices E & F.
Case Study on the Variable of Privacy in Microfinance
Privacy in Myanmar came under the test in 2004 when the state passed a law that
required the enforcement of a data protection clause for online certificate revelation to unmask
criminals. The open certificate would be inclusive of the user's identity details and secret codes
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during an online sign in, under the 'Electronic Transaction Law” (Myanmar Center for
Responsible Business, 2015). Before that date, the closest law on privacy was the general
mention of the term in the country's constitution (Myanmar Center for Responsible Business,
2015). MCRB surveyed seventy-three corporate sites, most of which were in microfinance. The
researcher formulated evaluation criteria that constituted the following set of model questions or
their equivalents:
1. Did the companies have in place an explicit privacy statement or data on how they
would handle their clients' and stakeholders' information?
2. How many of the 73 entities had their privacy statements embedded as part and parcel
of their corporate ethics and mission statements?
3. How many of the 73 companies had put into place sufficient data protection
information that a visitor to the website could easily consult?
4. How many entities of the seventy-three had not implemented any privacy regulations
on their sites? (Myanmar Center for Responsible Business, 2015).
Appendix G has the above information in the tabled form.
Failed Privacy Laws in Financial and Microfinance Sectors
Failed privacy policy case in a developed country. In developed countries like South
Korea, privacy laws have ever failed to protect 85% of all web users in the country that log in
daily and input private data (Mendel, Puddephatt, Wagner, Hawtin, & Torres, 2012). In June
2011, around thirty-five million subscribers of a communication company via which they used
their financial and other personal data lost their data after a hacking incident (Mendel et al.,
2012). The hacking took place in two major customer channels, namely the social media
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extension of the company and its search architecture. The reasons for the compromised data
might have been the requirement by the state on the use of SSN by customers before they could
log in (Mendel et al., 2012). In other words, the breach was occasioned by the very privacy laws
that sought to protect the bank and the personal data of consumers. Overall, 70% of native
Koreans and 90% of all residents of the country suffered from the hacking breach (Mendel et al.,
2012). The chart below presents the salient details.
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Figure 10: Number of users affected by the breach and total internet users in 2011 in South
Korea.
A failed case study in microfinance in developing countries. As a part of a report on
global trends on microfinance privacy breaches in the form of cyber-attacks, Mommens (2016),
presented the case of Senegal in three years. Between 2014 and 2016, the Sahel nation saw its
biggest micro-finance institutions suffer breaches alongside their governmental and bank
counterparts. The study presented the effects of the compromises in three contexts that included
(1) consumer data vulnerability due to weak regulation and (2) direct loss of money saved in
affected accounts. The third one was poor trust as a result of the delayed acquisition by
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microfinance institutions of the technology to prepare their customers for breaches. The outcome
of the above case study was to the effect that data laws in Senegal, with the latest one being of
the year 2008 (Boshe, 2016), have been ineffective as the attacks took place only half a dozen
years later. The table below presents the three variables above and their effect on Senegal's 2014
to 2016 micro-finance breaches.
Table 4
Reasons Behind Data Breaches in Senegal
Reason for privacy and data breach in

Outcome

Senegal's microfinance
Weak regulation of privacy and data

Loss of sensitive client information (Mommens,

protection laws

2016).

Direct loss of money in accounts

It accounted for 80 percent of all information
security breaches of microfinance in the study
period (Mommens, 2016).

Low trust by banks on technology

Due to the heightened rate of cyber-attacks,
micro-finance institutions have been left behind
from developing in tandem with technology
(Mommens, 2016).

From the above sample studies, there is a reflection of accountability despite ongoing
data compromises in developed nations. It is apparent that the heart of contention for most
developed countries is whether to adopt stronger laws, like the European ones than they currently
have or not (Movius & Krup, 2009). For instance, in the Morgan Stanley breach of 2014, the
Federal Trade Commission (2015), concluded that the bank had implemented both its rules and
GBLA rules of the United States. The Security and Exchange Commission (2016), questioned on
the enforcement of written data privacy laws in the bank.
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The case study problems in this section have also shown that most developing nations in
Africa and Asia still have outdated privacy clauses and are playing catch with cybersecurity. It is
apparent that countries like Senegal still have breaches in micro-finance security in the current
decade despite passing the 'Data Protection Act' (Boshe, 2016; Mommens, 2016). There is also a
widespread lack of concern about the sprouting informal banking institutions such as mobile
banking all over Africa. The latter institutions lack privacy laws like those that govern microfinance (Maimbo et al., 2011). From the evidence of customers' distrust of online banking and
the lack of awareness about the undue exposure of their private data, developing countries are
still recording poor data regulations (Bauer-Yazbeck et al., 2017). For instance, Nigeria has
suffered a massive five hundred and fifty million dollars' worth of losses in micro-finance and
micro-banking alone from cyber incidents (Baur-Yazbeck et al., 2017).
In light of the above foreclosing assessment, the following section will present the full
results of the above surveys and will offer discussions around the salient points such as privacy
laws.
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Chapter 4: Findings and Discussion
The following are the findings in consecutive order of the case studies presented in the
Methodology section. Each survey follows a discussion about the current privacy and
information security laws. The latter clauses will aid to interpret the results.
Findings on FTC (2015) and SEC (2016)
The case in question refers to the breach of consumer data through an internal worker of
Morgan Stanley in the United States from 2012 to 2014. The Federal body for privacy and cyber
regulations in the United States found that Morgan Stanley had implemented the necessary
controls for the preservation of the clients' privacy (Federal Trade Commission, 2015). The other
point was that the accessibility of information was only for business reasons, and the use of
external dongles by the workers was prohibited. The third point of the findings was that the
company had put in place stringent surveillance to assess the rate at which the staff disbursed
client information and the volume of such an exchange (Federal Trade Commission, 2015).
The immediate results were to the effect that the bank's worker breached a tiny repository
that was the only one that the company had not well maintained (Federal Trade Commission,
2015). This indicated a minor information security breach that FTC found severe but which it
allowed passing as the banker immediately overhauled the repository after the breach. It was also
notable that the compromised private information was in a system that had not received a
security update like the rest and highlighted that privacy and information security is a perpetual
process (Federal Trade Commission, 2015). Appendix A has the tabled results of FTC's closure
of the case.
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A year later, another body in the United States for protecting consumer rights offered a
one-million dollar fine on Morgan Stanley (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2016).
The bank would also dismiss the worker responsible for the breach. The findings of the securities
body were different from that of FTC in these respects: guilt, documentation, and seriousness of
the privacy breach. The table below explores the securities body's latter-day findings:
Table 5
The SEC Findings which Indicated that the US Bank had Inadequate Privacy Policies
Privacy and data breach Count

SEC Ruling

No policy in written form.

The company had no written regulations and
needed to come up with them (U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, 2016).

The severity of the breach.

The breach was severe as it took place in a
continuous period of three years, ending 2014
and affected nearly three-quarters of a million
accounts (U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2016).

The guilt of poor authorization system on

The company had maintained the same

data restrictions.

authorization programming on its network for a
decade, which made it possible for retrieval of
data for reasons other than business purposes
(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
2016)

Discussion. Two prominent points have come up in the above two findings: (1) what
constitutes a severe data breach in a developed country and (2) the internal data protection
mechanisms that measure the degree of privacy implementation by a financial institution.
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On the first point, the US Act of 2007 on identity theft applies because the large breached
accounts could easily pass into the hands of Internet impersonators (Johnson et al., 2014), this
affects information security as it applies to a cyber-threat. It also affects privacy in equal measure
as it leads to the possible sale of customer data (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
2016). Indeed, the seriousness of the case was that some of the consumer details after the breach
were on offer online (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2016).
On the second point, it is apparent that unlike many similar cases in the developing
countries, the US bank had some vibrant internal security mechanisms according to the earlier
ruling by the Federal Trade Commission (2015). However, as the securities body argued, the
bank may not have put enough internal control to restrict access to sensitive data (Securities
Exchange Commission, 2016). Therefore, there was what one may call an effort on the part of
the US bank but which did not fully satisfy the privacy law.
Findings on Tesco Bank Breach–UK
In 2016 United Kingdom saw 20,000 of Tesco Bank's customers have their money stolen
during a sophisticated cyber-attack which was probably the most significant data breach that the
UK's banking sector has faced at that time.
As Vovk (2016) points out that despite some links to fraudsters abroad, there is a
possibility that there was probably a mole inside Tesco Bank helping the thieves. The exercise
conducted on the bank's system shows that it is tough to penetrate and remotely access a bank's
network without assistance from inside, whether it was done deliberately or happened by
mistake.
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UK's Finance, insurance, and credit institutions were regulated by the Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA) in terms of data protection guided by the Data Protection Act 1998, however
with the introduction of The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), those institutions
have to comply with rules and regulations by both FCA and GDPR.
As Davis (2018) states, fundamentally the GDPR requires that an organization must now
directly inform individuals of what it does with their data–where and how it collects the data,
how it is processed, and to whom it is given. The organization has duties to make this
communication when it first collects data about individuals and when it changes how it will use
that data in the future.
The GDPR, as with the earlier data protection legislation, deals only with data about
living individuals, not business data. Data from which individuals cannot be identified, for
example, anonymized data, is not subject to the restrictions of the legislation. The legislation
primarily applies to a data controller–the organization that "determines the purposes and means
of processing personal data." Some obligations are also placed on a data processor–an
organization that "processes personal data on behalf of the controller" (Davis, 2018).
Discussion. Showing the active nature of UK's privacy regulations on financial
institutions the case of Tesco Breach is considered by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) as
a possible breach of Principle 3 of its Principles for Businesses. As Charlesworth and Stanton
(2016) point out under this principle, an organization must take reasonable care to organize and
control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems. This
raised questions as to whether adequate protection against the risk posed by evolving forms of
cybercrime was in place at Tesco Bank. Although the wording is not yet finalized on this case if
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a failure in this area is established there is the possibility that the bank will face a substantial
financial penalty.
Furthermore, Tesco Bank's regulatory problems may not be limited to compliance with
FCA, as the Information Commissioner (ICO) in the UK is also taking an interest. While the ICO
currently only has the power to issue monetary penalties of up to £500,000,
When the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) comes into force in 2018, banks
will have more reason to worry about the ICO. Penalties for serious data breaches under
that legislation could be up to 20,000,000 EUR or for an undertaking, up to 4% of the
total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher.
(Charlesworth & Stanton, 2016)
Apart from the aforementioned facts which gives evidence that UK has quite strong data
protection regulations in place which only got stronger with the implementation of GDPR in
May 2018, the law on unauthorized payments, Regulation 61 of the Payment Services
Regulations 2009, requires a bank to refund the amount of an unauthorized payment transaction
to the payer and to restore the debited payment account to the state it would have been in had the
unauthorized payment transaction not taken place. Hence it is safe to say the UK is largely on top
of things regarding having regulations in place and implementation in case of an incident like the
Tesco Bank breach.
Findings Australia: AAPT Hacking Case Study
As Srinivas (2015) described in his article, in Australia there are few cybersecurityrelated legal, legislative and regulatory obligations applicable for all industry sectors including
government agencies. Table 6 below lists those laws.
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Table 6
Australian Privacy-related Laws
Australian Privacy Principles (APP)

Cybercrime Act

Spam Act
Telecommunications Act

The APPs are intended to regulate the
collection, holding, use and disclosure of
personal information. The APP applies to
government and private institutions with more
than AUD 3 million annual revenue.
Offers comprehensive regulation of computer
and Internet-related offenses such as unlawful
access and computer trespass, damaging data
and impeding access to a computer, theft of
data, computer fraud, cyber-stalking, etc.
Enhanced the applicability of search and
Seizure provisions relating to electronic data.
Established a scheme for the regulation of
commercial email and other electronic
messages.
Enacted with the objective of protecting the
privacy of individuals who use the Australian
telecommunication system.

Although Australia lacks industry-specific data protection laws recently, they have
brought forward the below regulation which took effect on January 1st, 2017.
APRA Prudential Standards–CPS 220 (Risk Management) and CPS 231 (Outsourcing).
These require APRA regulated entities to have proper risk management strategies,
including IT systems, and to ensure that they properly manage outsourcing risk about
material business activities, respectively. (Clarke, 2016)
In this case of AAPT breach, the Australian Privacy Commissioner has given the verdict
that AAPT had breached the privacy act as they held the data despite it being stored on a third
party, WebCentral's, server. Mainly, AAPT had the obligation under Australian Privacy Policy
11.1 which states in circumstances where an agency outsources the data storage; it will still be
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likely to be regarded as holding the information under the new provisions and have obligations to
protect the information.
Discussion. As evident from the AAPT case study, Australia has quite strong privacy
policies although they lack industry-specific privacy laws. Australian Privacy Policies (APP)
cover a wide range of privacy concerns and the authority figure of a Privacy Commissioner also
gives more weight on privacy protection.
In this particular case study, the Australian Privacy Commissioner took the view that the
Primary company AAPT is responsible for the breach even though a third-party company named
WebCentral held the data breached. As discussed by Palfrey (2013) the Commissioner found
AAPT failed to take reasonable steps to secure the personal information as required by the
National Privacy Policies. Specifically, The Commissioner identified several deficiencies in the
security of data provisions in the contract between AAPT and WebCentral including:
•

Data was not assessed to determine whether it included personal information and its
sensitivity

•

Existing or emerging security risks were not required to be identified and addressed,

•

Vulnerability scanning and the effectiveness of the Cold Fusion application was not
required to be undertaken (Palfrey, 2013).

Moreover, in this occasion, the Privacy Commissioner had conducted an own motion
investigation as a response to the media reports of this incident, which means that in Australia
agencies are not relying on the fact that they have not received a complaint as an indication that
any privacy breaches will not be pursued.
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Findings on Adelola et al. (2015)
The results of the survey by Adelola et al. (2015), concerning the views of Nigerians on
data privacy online highlighted a typical scenario of developing countries, namely unconcern for
the governmental laws and minimal awareness.
The responses by the 72 participants on the question, “do you ever get concerned on the
information you offer online?” were as follows: 20% said they did all the time, while the
majority, at 44%, confirmed that they did so occasionally. Another 24% reported that they
speculated about their information quite often (Adelola et al., 2015). The chart below highlights
the full results.
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Figure 11: Nigerians on data privacy online, Adelola et al. (2015) survey results.
On question 2, "have spam messages from non-affiliates to your bank ever keep you on
the alert on your data?" the answers were as follows: 38% were concerned all the time, while
37% were bothered on occasion, 20% feared quite often, and 6% not at all as the chart below
illustrates:
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Figure 12: Nigerians survey results about unsolicited non-affiliate spam messages, in Adelola et
al. (2015) survey.
About the third question on “are you knowledgeable of identity theft and its
consequences?”, The results were as follows: 75% said they were aware while 21% were unsure
and 4 percent knew nothing. The chart below depicts the data:
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Figure 13: Nigerians awareness of identity theft according to Adelola et al. (2015) survey.
Regarding the final question to the effect, “is the state reliable as a custodian of privacy
of individual information?”, the results were as follows: 17% had a strong 'no,' 36% were unsure,
16% said 'yes,' while 31% simply said 'no.' The chart below has the details:
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Figure 14: Survey results on trust in the state on privacy, Nigerians under the Adelola et al.
(2015) survey.
Discussion. From the results, it is apparent that the long-term lack of privacy laws in
Nigeria has put finance institutions' customers to develop a distrust of the government on data.
Indeed, apart from the large banks, many upcoming financial institutions in the country are under
no privacy laws, while the majority do not enforce the existing ones (Egboro, 2015).
The closest code of privacy was the 'NCC Act of 2007' (DLA Piper, 2017). It stipulates
the safe upkeep of customer information in servers and the deletion of the same in due time
(DLA Piper, 2017). However, its role does not holistically cover the entire industry for it evolved
as an umbrella law for the telecoms (DLA Piper, 2017). For this reason, it is apparent that many
locals are not bothered about the information they enter online, as they are not sure whether a
privacy law covers them as the foregoing case study has revealed (Adelola, 2015).
Findings on Beck et al. (2011)
The case study by Beck et al. (2011), sought to convey the idea that there was a thin line
between what constitutes privacy laws for micro-finance institutions and informal banking
outlets. The survey found that in countries like Kenya, 33% of the respondents did not have any
financial affiliation, while 26% were in microfinance (Beck et al., 2011). In Malawi, on the other
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hand, the majority of the surveyed were informal financial institutions, at 55%, while 19% of the
participants were in microfinance. In Namibia, 2% were in microfinance while 52% were
unbanked. Uganda had 42% of microfinance respondents while 33% had no financial affiliation.
The respondents from Zambia were 14% from microfinance while 65% were unbanked (Beck et
al., 2011). Since informal banking outlets have little regulations, it was likely that some
microfinance institutions might also fall under the same categorization (Beck et al., 2011).
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Figure 15: Informal banking vs. microfinance, survey results by Beck et al. (2011).
Discussion. The aspects of privacy and data protection in most Sub-saharan Africa
nations borrow partially from an interpretation of telecom, constitutional or other electronic
privacy regulations (Jones, 2016). Therefore, with their larger population of users in comparison
with their microfinance equivalents, informal banks bring the risk of no direct law to quote about
privacy (Beck et al., 2011). In Kenya, for instance, mobile banking, as the most popular informal
banking method has technological advances that the local privacy laws have not yet covered
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(Malala, 2013). For these reasons, it is clear that the majority of informal banking avenues hurt
the adoption of strong data protection regulations in microfinance establishments due to their
similarities (Beck et al., 2011).
Findings on Gyabi & Shrivas (2016)
The case study by Gyabi and Shrivas (2016), sought to assess the implementation rate of
privacy and data security rules as well as the frequency of their enforcement in Ghanaian rural
micro-banks. The first question of “which data privacy policy does your company have?”
received the following answers: 36% remarked on recorded policies. 20% remarked of written
policies. 11% remarked on data encryption policies. 28% remarked on acceptance policies while
5% highlighted social networking policies (Gyabi & Shrivas, 2016). An acceptance policy is a
privacy statement mostly at the bottom of online sites of banks that the user ticks to the effect
that he or she consents to a service with or without reading it (Lee, 2016). Under EU data laws, it
is now possible to remove consent as easily as accepting it (Lee, 2016). A written policy is meant
for reading in full, and the user can retrieve it in a portable format if it is in an electronic
database (Lee, 2016). A recorded privacy policy is in audio format. Social networking policies
are privacy settings that govern individual preferences including the sharing of data with people
by age group (Aldhafferi, Watson, & Sajeev, 2013). Data encryption policies govern the securing
of personal data by companies when sending it via electronic format such as via email.
On the question on “which was the last date when your bank updated data breach action
guideline?” the results were as follows: 19% reported no update. 46% reported updates in 12
months. Four percent reported an extent of over 5 years without updates. 22% reported updates
in 24 months. Nine percent reported updates every 5 years (Gyabi & Shrivas, 2016).
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On the question: "does your financial outlet undertake mock information recovery tests to
prepare for breaches?" the study recorded these outcomes: 5% did not know. 46% reported a
'Yes.' 49% reported a 'No ' (Gyabi & Shrivas, 2016). The chart below presents the graphical
results of this last question:
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Figure 16: Percentage of frequent data breach mock tests by rural micro-banks in Ghana, Gyabi,
and Shrivas (2016).
Discussion. From the data above, it is apparent that 'acceptance' data privacy policies and
recorded policies at 28% and 36%, respectively, are higher than written policies, at 20%, data
encryption policies, at 11% and social networking policies, at 5% (Gyabi & Srhivas, 2016). It is
also apparent that nearly half of the surveyed rural banks do not regularly update their security
and data protection policies, manifest in the fact that they rarely test their systems for
vulnerabilities (Gyabi & Shrivas, 2016). Micro-finance institutions in Ghana are under the
'Banking Act of the year 2004' (Asante, 2017). Though it deals mainly with financial matters, the
clause regulates on many issues, including data privacy. Indeed, many micro-finance institutions
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did not pass the test when it first came in the mid-2000s (Asante, 2017). From the fact that the
above survey took place four years after the enactment of the newest privacy law in Ghana of
2012 (Dagbanja, 2016), it is apparent that the micro-finance institutions are still in the
developing stages.
Findings on Shuhidan et al. (2017)
The findings on the Shuhidan et al. (2017), Malaysia case study on the security of the
data of microfinance consumers who used mobile banking was to the effect that:
1. “Are you of the view that your mobile banking data is at risk every time you sign in?”
With a mean score of 3.2, with 5 being the highest score, customers expressed concern
that their sensitive data would be accessible in their absence after they had first logged into their
accounts (Shuhidan et al., 2017).
2. “Are you of the view that your mobile banking data is at risk of hacking?”
With a mean score of 3.6, where 5 is the highest value, most customers expressed the
misgivings that they did not use mobile-based microfinance because their data might be
compromised by hackers (Shuhidan et al., 2017).
The results in graphical form are as below:

Mean score of respondents on risk
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Figure 17: Perception of privacy risk at sign-in vs. privacy risk of hacking.
Discussion. The microfinance sub-sector in Malaysia dates back to the late 1980s to
facilitate loan accessibility to the era's unbanked population (Mokhtar, Nartea & Gan, 2012). Up
to 2010, Malaysia utilized a 20th-century data law that did not reflect emerging technologies.
After the national assembly passed the bill on individual data privacy in 2010, it was a turning
point. Before then, even the constitution did not have a direct mention of 'banking privacy,' and
so courts used precedents to resolve data breach cases, especially in mobile banking (Cieh,
2013). This legal background may highlight the above case studies results in that many locals are
yet to approach the laws seriously fully and they take to privacy in microfinance warily (Cieh,
2013).
Findings on the Variable of Information Security Laws in East Africa/
West Africa Report (2017)
This is about the report by Baur-Yazbeck et al. (2017) that cybercrime in East and West
Africa pertains mostly to financial losses via mobile banking data vulnerabilities. As
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aforementioned in the methodology section, the variables of cybercrime in these Sub-Saharan
Africa regions included identity theft, virus planting and 'social engineering' (Baur-Yazbeck et
al., 2017). The results of the report on lax mobile banking in East Africa presented consolidated
results across the above three strands of information security (Baur-Yazbeck et al., 2017). In the
East African region, Kenya had the highest negative outcomes: poor information security in
mobile finance cost the country a hundred and seventy-five million US dollars in 2016 (BaurYazbeck et al., 2017). Tanzania followed with eighty-five million US dollars while data breaches
in Uganda's micro-banking amounted to thirty-five million US dollars. In West Africa, poor
information security regulation cost the micro-banking sector of Nigeria five hundred and fifty
US dollars. Appendix F has information on the percentage of cyber crime related to mobile
banking using the above Sub-saharan countries' data.
Discussion. To alleviate data breaches associated with its rise as the regional pioneer of
mobile banking, Kenya enacted an act in 2010 that embraced the communications sector (BaurYazbeck et al., 2017). Uganda, on the other hand, has enacted information security laws that
borrow from similar cyber decrees in the economic bloc of East African nations (Baur-Yazbeck
et al., 2017). Therefore, from the above financial losses, it is apparent that the laws are not well
implemented.
Findings on the Variable of Privacy Laws in Myanmar Survey (2015)
The following are the findings of the case above study in Myanmar in 2015. The case
focused on the number of companies, seventy-three in all, which implemented various aspects of
privacy policies.
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Findings. On the issue of the explicit statement of privacy statements, just 6 of the 23
entities had clear guidelines on clients', employees' and affiliates' information (Myanmar Center
for Responsible Business, 2015). Only three had their privacy statements embedded onto their
main corporate policies, such as mission and ethics. Regarding exceptions to data privacy, one
Information Service Provider had no disclosure on privacy anywhere on its site (Myanmar
Center for Responsible Business, 2015). Overall, the bulk of the surveyed entities especially in
micro-finance did not parade information on the way they would handle their clients' privacy as
the law required of them. The chart below depicts the findings.
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Figure 18: Availability of privacy policy information on website (Myanmar Center for
Responsible Business, 2015).
Discussion. In Myanmar, it is illegal by law to misuse the private information of clients
of micro-finance establishments (Choudhary, 2017). This is under the first item of the
Notifications decree of 2016 (Choudhary, 2017). The clause not only bars the institutions not to
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avail sensitive details that are personal to clients but that a search about a customer's state of debt
should not dig too deep into the individual's privacy (Choudhary, 2017). For this reason, it is
apparent that most micro-banks in Myanmar are not able to even assess the amount of debt a
client can afford because of the restrictions (Choudhary, 2017). For this reason, they often rely
on other banks that the customer may be privy to for verification purposes (Choudhary, 2017). It
is notable that the Notifications Act of 2016 came after the above survey took place and thus had
no effect on the outcomes.
Findings on Sun and Lee (2013)
This section concerns the ineffectiveness of data privacy management system by banks in
South Korea to keep up with the country's 'Personal Information Protection Law of 2012' (Sun &
Lee, 2013). The study suggests that despite the increment in online banking, there is a dearth of
an understanding of the most effective privacy management system or database in banking
institutions (Sun & Lee, 2013). The authors assert that such a system has been challenging to
maintain due to the fast pace of financial software in a technology-savvy country like South
Korea (Sun & Lee, 2013). Some of the challenges include the lack of enough resources in private
financial outlets to regularly calibrate such a system (Sun & Lee, 2013).
Discussion. It is clear that in Korea, privacy issues in banking emanate from
technological advances and powerful privacy laws which banks find it hard to maintain (Yoo,
Kang, & Kim, 2015). The 2012 law was a follow-up to the 2006 EFTA law that sought to
safeguard information security in finance (Sohn, 2016; Sun & Lee, 2013). In 2017, the sharp rise
of financial software in banking saw the country's watchdog on data security highlight that the
more users get access to programs, the greater their financial data becomes less private (Yonhap,
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2017). Other sources claim that users may even have low motivation in the utility of online
banking if technology presents more privacy exposure than it covers (Kim & Chi, 2015).
Data privacy in Korea had existed since 1999 when the 'E-Documents Act' (Sohn, 2016)
came to be. In the course of the past 20 years. This act has grown together with the 'EFTA'
framework that guides information security in finance (Sohn, 2016). Therefore, despite strong
privacy in a developing country, there are still technical vulnerabilities. Appendix I and J have
the details of the progress of the data privacy laws timeline in Korea.
Findings on Mommens (2016)
The case in question is a publication in 2016 that stipulated that between 2014 and 2015,
Senegal's largest microfinance outlets suffered breaches together with their governmental
equivalents from cybercrime. The outcome of the above case study was to the effect that data
laws in Senegal, with the latest one being of the year 2008 (Boshe, 2016), have been ineffective
as the attacks took place only half a dozen years later. The table below presents the three
variables above and their effect on Senegal's 2014 to 2016 micro-finance breaches.
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Table 7
Reasons for Data Breaches in Senegal
Reason for privacy and data breach in

Outcome

Senegal's microfinance
Weak regulation of privacy and data

Loss of sensitive client information (Mommens,

protection laws

2016).

Direct loss of money in accounts

It accounted for 80 percent of all information
security breaches of microfinance in the study
period (Mommens, 2016).

Low trust by banks on technology

Due to the heightened rate of cyber-attacks,
micro-finance institutions have been left behind
from developing in tandem with technology
(Mommens, 2016).

Discussion. In Senegal, information security and privacy regulation are composite of
'Law Number 2008 to 2012' (Privacy International, 2013). The clause covers a range of data
borderlines including that between users of mobile devices and banking data. The closest it
comes to microfinance is the stipulation for financial and mobile service providers to uphold
individuals' data and not transmit it to affiliates without the owner's consent (Privacy
International, 2013). Applying these laws to the outcomes of 2014 to 2016, it is apparent that
there were loopholes for the country as the breaches happened even in the existence of the
cybercrime 'Law Number 2008-2011' (Privacy International, 2013). As a proof of their
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ineffectiveness, the 2014-2016 attacks took place just a few years after the laws (Mommens,
2016; Boshe, 2016).
The Conclusion to Findings and Discussion
Of the ten case studies, apart from Malaysia and Nigeria all other developing countries
show a low presence of privacy regulations, while all four developing countries studied shows
high to medium presence of privacy regulations. Whereas, level of enforcement of privacy
regulations and level of effectiveness of privacy regulations, the other two factors discussed all
has a clear differential between developed and developing countries with only Malaysia as a
developing country has a medium level of enforcement and effectiveness in privacy regulations
(see Appendix H).
The Federal Trade Commission (2015), and the Securities Exchange Commission (2016),
case studies present mixed outcomes for the 2012-2014 Morgan Stanley data breach in the US.
Adeola et al. (2015), show the failure of the application of privacy laws in Nigeria's microfinance sector. The same applies to Shuhidan et al. (2017), in their survey on Malaysia where
customers distrust signing in for fear of data misuse. Gyabi and Shrivas (2016), also reveal a
failure in the privacy protection mandate in Ghana's rural banking. In Burma, the Myanmar
Center for Responsible Business (2015), reports that just three out of seventy-three entities have
clear on-site guidelines on the privacy of the users and affiliates. Mendel et al. (2012), also show
that breaches still happen in a developed country, namely South Korea. The study has also
documented failure in Senegal from a cybercrime spree of 2012 to 2014 (Mommens, 2016).
Regarding the variable of the presence of privacy regulations, it is apparent that most
countries within developing countries have no sufficient data protection measures. For instance,
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Kenya and Nigeria have both lost millions of dollars through mobile banking crimes (BaurYazbeck et al., 2017). Regarding the variable of the presence of privacy regulations, it is clear
that developing countries have outdated policies that do not reflect modern technology and thus
most consumers are not aware of the laws. In developed nations, privacy laws are quite clear, for
instance in the European Union, but still, breaches happen such as the Snowden leaks (Kuner,
2014).
Table 8
Variables of the Research (Results in Appendix H).
Variables

Evaluation

Presence of privacy regulations

Low/Medium/High

Level of Enforcement of privacy regulations

Low/Medium/High

The effectiveness of privacy regulations

Low/Medium/High

Presence of privacy regulations and enforcement of privacy regulation both affect the
effectiveness of those privacy regulations. The findings reveal that the level of effectiveness of
the privacy and data protection legislation in developing countries is ineffective to keep up with
modern technologies. Those of the developed countries, on the other hand, are strong but require
regular updates.
From the above evaluation, the consensus is to the effect that data security is still in a
developing stage in the Third World while its level of embracement in the developed countries
revolves around the maximum level of implementation. For instance, the findings in the South
Korea data breach of 2011 reveal that in the case where 90 percent of the web users were
affected by a data breach, the reason was extra-strong SSN enforcement (Mendel et al., 2012).
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Therefore, extra precautionary measures may misfire when the hackers' technology gets access to
the most sensitive SSN information of the users (Mendel et al., 2012). This is despite the laws in
Korea being up-to-date.
In Malaysia's ongoing modernization of privacy laws, the ramifications of waiting too
long between the 1990s and the current decade have seen many consumers fear that signing in
leaves their data open to misuse (Shuhidan et al., 2017). Indeed, it is one of the states in the
developing world with the recent impressive growth of privacy laws. The latest legislation
reflects a country eager to align its privacy protocols with those of the European Union and the
regional south-east Asia economic bloc (Yu, 2014).
In Africa, the findings reveal the lack of awareness by the customers due to the deficiency
of information on their online privacy, especially about online eCommerce and micro-finance
(Adelola et al., 2015). For instance, the results from Nigeria have shown that just 20% of
financial services' users in a survey are concerned about what they input online while 44% are
concerned only on occasion (Adelola et al., 2015). This is even though the West African nation
perpetually reigns in on banks and micro-finance institutions with new laws, the latest one being
in 2010 (Makulilo, 2012).
In short, there is a disparity between the developed privacy laws of Western countries that
make financial firms accountable for privacy compromises (Securities & Exchange Commission,
2016) and those of developing nations. The laws of the latter either exist only generally in the
constitution, are in draft format or are behind technology (Makulilo, 2012; Privacy International,
2016).
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
In summation, three glaring elements define privacy and data regulations worldwide. The
first one is the imitation of the general data protection regulations of the European Union in
developed nations. The second is the slow drafting of new laws in developing countries. The
third one is the exposure of consumer privacy to hackers and social engineering breaches,
especially in micro-finance institutions (Baur-Yazbeck et al., 2017).
About the first point, the European Union's new framework that governs online data
breaches is set to overrule those of member states in mid-2017. Cross-border data leaks have
made many countries see the need for EU-like regulations that are 'international' (Kuner, 2014).
The legal conundrum surrounding whether to adopt similar regulations is that they are quite
strong for nations outside the EU as even local businesses are yet to prepare for them (Gordon,
2017). Nevertheless, the lack of improvisation of similar policies may hurt trade relations where
data breaches may lead to misunderstandings. The United States, for this reason, is still
deliberating whether to forge stringent rules like those on the other side of the Atlantic (Movius
& Krup, 2009).
In respect to the second point of slow privacy and data law development in developing
countries, the study has shown that there are exceptions but these are few. For instance, Malaysia
is under a renaissance of its 1990s laws with an ongoing stance towards EU-affiliated policies
(Yu, 2014). In South America, despite the common use of electronic payment systems, Brazil
was still indecisive on the promulgation of cyber laws to govern the cards by 2014 (Johnson et
al., 2014). Most Asian nations are still relying on their cyber protection laws of the 1990s that do
not bear on the changing technology (Greenleaf, 2014). The majority of Sub-Saharan African
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states still have underdeveloped micro-finance data laws: for instance in Uganda; the laws are yet
to exist although the majority of the population relies on the micro institutions for their banking
needs (Mwesigwa, 2010).
On the point of data exposure by both financial and micro-finance institutions, the study
has shown that the effect is prevalent in the developing countries. Worthy mentions include
Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana, which are some of the countries in Africa with the highest rates of
micro-finance cybercrime (Baur-Yazbeck et al., 2017). In Kenya, for instance, lax mobile
banking information security cost the country $175 million in 2016 (Baur-Yazbeck et al., 2017).
However, when a breach happens in a developed nation, it is usually of high impact. For
instance, the South Korea hacking of 2011 left thirty-five million dependents of the country's
Internet affected. In the United States, on the other hand, a worker at Morgan Stanley left over
seven hundred and thirty thousand clients' files up for sale online despite the strong measures the
firm put as a safeguard (Federal Trade Commission, 2015).
In short, if the current privacy law in Europe comes to affect other states, it may lead to
fewer cases of data breaches in states that implement it (Hert & Papakonstantinou, 2013).
However, if developing nations stay put with outdated systems, technological breakthroughs by
hackers will force the countries to improvise new laws (Hert & Papakonstantinou, 2013). In the
current context, it is apparent that few financial companies in, especially, developing nations
fully enforce privacy laws.
Limitations
During the evaluation of research material for this work, the study encountered the lack
of sufficient information that directly applied to the subject of privacy information in the context
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of micro-finance and finance. The majority of the research literature hinged upon privacy and
data protection in a general context. Another limitation was an unclear separation between microfinance and informal banking, especially in the context of information security in developing
countries. While some nations have data privacy laws specifically for microfinance, the
legislation are often overshadowed by those for mobile banking which has the majority of users.
A final and significant limitation was the fact that legislation in microfinance in most databases
was of a credit regulation nature as opposed to data protection and privacy. Much of the gist of
the legal framework aims to buffer consumers against financial exploitation by the micro-banks
but not on privacy. To overcome these limitations, there was the necessity for thorough research
of only case studies that were relevant to the study.
Future Work
In trying to answer one of the major discrepancies of this research, namely consumers'
lack of awareness in privacy issues, especially in developing nations, future research can dwell
on privacy and data protection education (Dennis, 2011). Certain third world countries like the
Philippines are having such literacy drives (Dennis, 2011). This will alleviate the tendency by
microfinance institutions in places like Lebanon and Nigeria to informally disburse client
information to affiliates or openly discuss consumer data openly irrespective of privacy
restrictions for such behavior in the respective countries (Abbassi, Khaled, & Lauer, 2009;
Egboro, 2015). When consumers learn their privacy rights, they will not warrant their
confidential to become a discussion point in boardrooms (Egboro, 2015).
The coming of the General Data Protection Regulation in Europe in mid-May 2018 will
also have an educational impact on countries outside the European Union that wish to follow it.
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This is because they will need to educate their consumers about the rules when they adopt them
just like European companies are preparing for the rules (Gordon, 2017). Thus, there is a need to
research further on the aspect of consumer awareness of privacy laws through education.
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Appendix A: FTC Ruling on Morgan Stanley Breach of Customer Privacy Through
Exposure of Sensitive Data Online (FTC, 2015)
Morgan Stanley Violation
FTC Ruling
Information security breach of customer's data. The bank had implemented the necessary steps
to prevent a data breach, so the case was an
isolated one.
Exposure to consumer privacy.
The bank was not liable for the individual
worker breach as it had prohibited workers'
entry into highly protected data repositories and
so this was an isolated case.
Lack of system security to reduce data breach. The bank had a well-maintained cyber-security
network. The case applied only to a minor file
repository which the company repaired
immediately after the breach.
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Appendix B: Survey on Privacy View of Users of Nigeria's Financial Institutions
by Adelola et al. (2015)
Question

Response

Do you ever get concerned about the

44% said only occasionally.

data you offer online?
Have spam messages from non-affiliates 38% said they are on the alert all the time while
37% said only on occasion.
to your bank ever keep you on the alert on your
data?
Are you knowledgeable of identity theft 4% said they were unaware while 75 percent
said they were aware.
and its consequences?
Is the state reliable as a custodian of privacy of 36% were undecided, 31% said no while 16%
said yes.
individual information?
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Appendix C: Privacy Questions to Malaysian Mobile Bankers on the Security
of Their Data Online
Questions relating to privacy
Answer
How do you feel about your private information
being used by mobile banks?
Are you of the view that your mobile banking
data is at risk of hacking?
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Appendix D: Gyabi & Shrivas (2016) Study on Ghana Micro-banking in
Rural Ashanti Recorded the Following Questionnaire Data
Question
Results
Which kind of data privacy policy does your 36 percent remarked on recorded policies. 20%
company have?
remarked of written policies. 11 percent
remarked on data encryption policies. 28
percent remarked on acceptance policies while
5 percent highlighted social networking
policies.
1. Which was the last date when your
19% reported no update. 46% reported updates
bank updated data breach action
in 12 months. 4% reported above five years
guideline?
without updates. 22% reported updates in 24
months.
Does your financial outlet undertake mock
5% did not know. 46% reported a 'Yes.' 49%
information recovery tests to prepare for
reported a 'No.'
breaches?
If your financial outlet undertakes mock
19% remarked no update ever. 46% remarked
information recovery tests, how often does this updates in 12 months. 4% remarked above five
happen?
years updates. 22% remarked updates in 24
months.
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Appendix E: The Financial Dffect of Lax Regulations in Microfinance
(Mobile Banking) in East Africa and West Africa
Effect of poor laws Kenya in US$
on mobile banking
in Africa
Cybercrime (Virus, 175 million
malware, identity
theft, social
engineering)

Uganda in US$

Tanzania US$

Nigeria US$

35 million

85 million

550 million
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Appendix F: Level of Cyber Crime Related to Lax Information Security in
Mobile Banking in 2016 by Baur-Yazbeck et al. (2017)

Tanzania
9%
Nigeria
66%

Uganda
4%

Kenya
21%
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Appendix G: Implementation of Privacy Regulations on Websites in Myanmar in 2014
Privacy Survey model question

Total: N=73

Did the companies have in place an

6

explicit privacy statement or data on how they
would handle their clients' and stakeholders'
information?
How many of the 73 entities had their

3

privacy statements embedded as part and parcel
of the corporate ethics and mission statement?
How many of the 73 companies had put Majority
into place sufficient information that a survey
could access and interpret about data
protection?
How many entities of the seventy-three 1
had not implemented any privacy regulations on
their sites?
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Appendix H: Empirical Results of the 10 Case Studies. The Summary of Success or Failure
Empirical Results of Privacy and Information Security Laws Effectiveness
From Different Countries in the 10 Case Studies
Country/Case study

Presence
of Level of Enforcement
Security/Privacy
of
Privacy
Regulations
Low/Medium/High)
(Low/Medium/High)

Effectiveness of
privacy Reg. (as
per
the
Researchers)

United States

High

High

Medium

United Kingdom

High

High

High

Australia

Medium

High

Medium

South Korea

Medium

Medium

Medium

Nigeria

Medium

Low

Low

Kenya, Malawi,
Namibia, Zambia

Low

Low

Low

Malaysia

Medium

Medium

Medium

Ghana

Low

Low

Low

Uganda, Tanzania

Low

Low

Low

Myanmar

Low

Low

Low

Senegal

Low

Low

Low
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Appendix I: The Progress of Four Korean Privacy Laws in the Early to mid-2000s
2007
2006
2005

Year

2004
Progress of four Korean privacy
acts in 2000s

2003
2002
2001
2000
E.Documents
Act

DSA

ECCPA

EFTA

104
Appendix J: The Timeline of Privacy Laws Related to Finance in Korea Since 1999
Korea Privacy Law
E-Documents Act of 1999
DSA of 2002
ECCPA of 2002
EFTA of 2006

Purpose
Privacy and data security online (Sohn, 2016).
For digital signature authorization online
especially in finance (Sohn, 2016).
Privacy of consumers online in e-Commerce,
banking and other industries (Sohn, 2016).
For information security in finance (Sohn,
2016).

